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Progressive Dissenter: Herbert Hoover's
Opposition to Truman's Overseas
Military Policy
Donald J. Mrozek
ON DECEMBER 20,1950, HERBERT HOOVER addressed the
nation over the Mutual Broadcasting System radio network. His
speech challenged the overseas policies of the Truman Adminis-
tration and heralded a conservative Republican victory for 1952.
Millions listened to Hoover's speech, and it received much atten-
tion in national publications. Hoover called for withdrawal of
U.S. ground troops from Europe, and demanded recalculation of
the relationship between U.S. interests overseas and the policy
approved to secure them. Time characterized Hoover's ideas as
resurgent isolationism, "ripping off its winding sheet and making
loud speeches—and attracting crowds of listeners." Newsweek
suggested that Hoover was rejecting the internationalism that had
been developing in Congress at least since the start of World War
11. U.S. News and World Report somewhat more sympathetically
recorded wide-ranging popular approval for Hoover's ideas that
contrasted sharply with hostility among public officials. His
words were circulated through Vital Speeches of the Day, and
Hoover reprinted the message several times. '
'See Herbert Hoover, "Our National Policies in This Crisis," broadcast on
December 20, 1950, reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, XVII, (January 1,
1951), 165-167. Also see Times. LVII, (January 1, 1951), 9-10; Newsweek,
XXXVII, (January 1, 1951), 10-11; U.S. News and World Report, XXX, (January
12, 1951), 20-21, and XXX, (January 19, 1951), 16-17 which sharply differentiate
among the positions of Truman, Taft, and Hoover. U.S. News and World Report.
XXX, (January 12, 1951), 21 presented a report on constituent mail received by
Senators and Congressmen concerning Hoover's proposal. The mail favored
Hoover by an overwhelming margin.
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Why did people pay aftention to this repudiated former presi-
dent—a reminder as much as a survivor of the ashes of his own
era? In part, it was because Hoover had managed to salvage
much since the electoral debacle of 1932. He had returned in an
advisory capacity to study food distribution and international re-
lief programs, areas in which he had registered some of his most
conspicuous and applauded successes.^ In the post-war era of
permanent mobilization in which civilians were to contribute to
an elusive "national security," a supposedly bipartisan Washing-
ton sent out its call for Hoover to join the swelling ranks of the
new "soldiers of freedom," the cold warriors. With Hoover so
long shorn of command and political support, an invitation to
him surely seemed safe.
Yet Hoover's speech in 1950 broke away in a new direction. It
attracted attention not only because it deviated from Truman's
policy but because it provided alternatives to the criticism of
that policy by Robert Taft. After Hoover called for the removal of
American troops from Europe and for a virtual termination of
American aid to the continent (a call that he later withdrew), Tan
was reported as being only in "general agreement with a lot of
Hoover's speech" and as agreeing "with many of the general prin-
ciples he states." By contrast. Senate Republican floor leader
Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska proclaimed: "He exactly expressed
my sentiments." As T?we reported, "Indiana's 100% Isolationist
Homer Capehart rejoiced: 'I agree with him 100%.' " Taft's
statement was grudging support indeed in the face of Wherry's
and Capehart's enthusiasm.' In any case, Taft's position was al-
ready compromised. His role as a Truman critic was jeopardized
by his political ambitions and by his "bipartisan" participation in
White House conferences designed to yield approval of adminis-
tration policies. He voted in favor of the United Nations—an
agency that Hoover found dubious in origin and damaging in ef-
'Hoover's advice was not merely offered but solicited. See Harry S. Truman,
Memoirs. I, Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y., 1955). Also see Thomas G.
Paterson. Soviet-American Confrontation. Postwar Reconstruction and the
Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore, 1973), 82, 87, 92-93, 244.
'Others agreeing with Hoover's ideas were former Ambassador Joseph P.
Kennedy and Senator Styles Bridges. See Kennedy, "Present Policy is Politically
and Morally Bankrupt." Vital Speeches of the Day. XVII, (January 1, 1951). 170-
173; Bridges, "Blueprint for Victory," Vital Speeches of the Day. XVII, (Febru-
ary 15, 1951),. 265-267.
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feet. He voted for the North Atlantic Treaty—the promissory note
that Hoover feared. Taft's support of NATO made his opposition
to Truman's domestic policies ineffectual. The dramatic confron-
tation that Hoover and his sympathizers had with the Truman
Administration overshadowed the disagreements that existed be-
tween Hoover and Taft.''
Hoover's closest intellectual ally was probably Douglas Mac-
Arthur. For MacArthur had complained of Truman's asking for
a new kind of military loyalty—to the presidential administration
rather than to the nation. Hoover rejected a comparable form of
political loyalty in which all ideology, principles, and beliefs were
finally hostage to the demands of international policy and na-
tional security. In his relentless application of principles to poli-
tics, such as he exhibited in his handling of the problems of the
Depression, Hoover resembled not Taft, but his mentor Woodrow
Wilson.* The coherence of his policies and his unwillingness to
modify them fiowed from a dogmatism that made him the last of
the great Progressives. He viewed the Roosevelt years as an aber-
ration that distorted the relationships among domestic and inter-
national policies. Like the politicians and statesmen of the Pro-
gressive era. Hoover believed that foreign commitments were
manifestations of the internal workings of the state. The country's
domestic policies ought never to be affected by foreign pressures.
In this way. Hoover became the great preacher of the American
creed amid the rubble of Progressive ideology. One of the few who
challenged the very structure of the new order. Hoover also re-
jected what it produced. He criticized international alliances and
the mobilization at home that contributed to an emerging mili-
tary-industrial complex.
Hoover's speech was a call to arms for many conservatives who
had languished in futile hostility during the era of Franklin Roose-
velt, first overwhelmed by the Great Depression and then used
but not heeded in World War II. He sought to capitalize on the
'For a clear delineation of differences among Truman, Taft, and Hoover, see
U.S. Neu's and World Report. XXX, (January 12, 1951), 20-21. A general study of
Truman's approach to defense is Donald J. Mrozek, "Peace Through Strenth:
Strategic Air Power and the Mobilization of the United States for the Pursuit of
Foreign Policy, 1945-1955" (Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University, 1972), espe-
cially Chapters 4-7.
'For a demonstration of Hoover's sympathy with Wilson's ideas, see Herbert
Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1958), passim.
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unpopularity of the Korean War to reverse American overseas
policy. In the process, ironically, he helped create a climate of
political opportunity in which General MacArthur became in-
volved in the controversy that ended with his removal from com-
mand in Korea; liberal cold warriors pressed for greater commit-
ments to European defense; and Truman confirmed the
dominance of the executive branch in military and foreign affairs.
Given this record of results so at odds with his intentions. Hoover
assumes significance as a popular archaism—a Progressive con-
science calling for baftle against the forces of post-Rooseveltian
politics. The campaign to break Truman's overseas military poli-
cies was a move to vindicate and restore the political economy
swamped by the New Deal and World War II.
The political origins of Hoover's assault on Truman's military
policies rested in hostility to the grand mechanism of political bi-
partisanship. He considered this effort to build a national consen-
sus behind the administration both fraudulent and subversive,
and he believed that it would end in a dictatorship of the execu-
tive branch. From the middle of 1950, Hoover solicited analyses
outlining the evils of bipartisanship. His research aide Arthur
Kemp urged him to depart from the Republican National Com-
mittee's policy of general support for the war effort because it re-
quired silence about the administration's foreign policy. He
pointed to Dean Acheson's comment on May 1, 1950 that "there
is no longer any difference between foreign questions and domes-
tic questions."' If Republicans sincerely differed with Democrats
over domestic policy and the nature of American society, collab-
oration in international affairs was impossible. Similarly, the
choice of programs overseas must always take into account their
impact within the United States.
On July 7, 1951, Hoover sent a memorandum to Senators
Homer Ferguson and Kenneth Wherry and to columnist George
Sokolsky indicating that the prerequisites for a constitutionally
'Memorandum of information from Arthur Kemp to Herbert Hoover (un-
dated; by context, late 1950); Papers of Herbert Hoover (Hoover Papers), Herbert
Hoover Presidential Library, Post-Presidential Subject File, Foreign Policy-Gen-
eral folder. For Truman's views, see Truman, Memoirs, II (Garden City, N.Y.,
1956). Also useful is the insightful essay of William Appleman Williams, "What
This Country Needs . . .," reviewing Gene Smith, The Shattered Dream: Herbert
Hoover and the Great Depression, m The New York Review of Books, (November
5, 1970), 7-11.
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viable bipartisanship were lacking. "Present-day administra-
tions," he noted of both Truman and Roosevelt, "avoid the spirit
of the Constitution by making 'agreements,' 'Joint Declarations,'
'doctrines' or settlements under the cloak of the United Nations
which detour the Senate's advice and consent." Hoover denied
that "the employment of Republicans by the State Department"
made these actions bipartisan since they were "not acting under
the authority of the Republican members of the Congress."'
By November 8, 1951, Hoover had become even more hostile
to collaboration with Truman and the Democrats; and he
opposed the government's policy in Korea despite his advocacy of
military support for Chiang Kai-shek. In draft material for
further advice to Republican leaders and for use in public state-
ments. Hoover declared: "The whole idea of a bipartisan foreign
policy is the negation of a fundamental American freedom." The
party out of power was to serve as a "check and balance" on the
party responsible for action. Distressed at the development of
American politics from 1933 and into the Korean War, Hoover
lashed out against the uncritical acceptance of foreign policies
and suggested that loyalty to the nation's war effort did not re-
quire allegiance to Truman's objectives and methods:
Bi-partisanship is/means one party. That is the basis of Communist
organization. The whole recent history of bi-partnership in foreign af-
fairs is a record of failures for lack of proper ventilation and criticism
. . . Even in war . . . foreign political policies outside of military action
should be the scene of full criticism or we will make more gigantic politi-
cal mistakes such as destroyed the hope of peace after World War II . '
Again the former president argued that the Constitution was
under fire, stating that the administration had violated the docu-
ment by going to war in Korea "under the most specious reason-
ing."' The smaller issues, even one as difficult as the Korean
War, merely illustrated the administration's disinterest in the
Constitution and the network of American values for which it was
presumed to stand.
The Korean War revealed the practical consequences that lay
'"Confidential Memorandum on the Essentials of Bi-Partisan Foreign
Policy," from Herbert Hoover to Homer Ferguson, Kenneth Wherry, and George
Sokolsky, July 7, 1951; Hoover Papers, Public Statements, Tab 3298.
'Draft material for "Confidential Memorandum . . ." of July 7, 1951;
Hoover Papers, Post-Presidential Subject File, Foreign Policy—General folder.
'Ibid.
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in store for the nation if it continued to violate tradition in de-
terming its international program. The war forced political lead-
ers to question the efficacy of the available peace-keeping
machinery, and it confirmed pro-Hoover factions in their aliena-
tion from the United Nations as it currently functioned. It was
futile, as they saw it, to preserve the organization unless it could
serve as the political basis for united forceful action to protect
American interests. The Korean War also revitalized their old
arguments: the need to prevent a militarization of the society, the
impossibility of supporting a permanent war economy, the danger
of alliances that entangled without advantage, the superiority of
air power, and the disadvantages of land warfare. The war gave
dissidents a chance to capitalize on public distress over interna-
tional affairs and disaffection with Truman in particular. Hoover-
ites contemplated more than a showdown with the Soviet Union
and its allies in the United Nations—they sought a showdown be-
tween the United States and its own allies.'"
On July 20, 1950, Hoover wrote to Senator Ferguson: "I
would prefer that the non-Communist world be absolutely united,
but, alternatively, the United States should know where we
stand." He urged that member states of the United Nations be
forced to recognize China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union as
aggressors and that the United States subsequently withdraw
from military action beyond the western hemisphere. He thus ex-
pressed his resentment that Washington's allies hesitated to re-
spond to the crises that the United States government took so
seriously." In a speech on July 30, Hoover demanded that the
United Nations be "reorganized without the Communists in it" so
that "the United States would be a part of a phalanx, and not a
single spear." This would allow at least "partial mobilization of
non-Communist nations." The return of the Soviet Union to the
United Nations would mean that they would "propose some de-
vice which will divide the United Nations." Even this matter
would have been less serious if the western Europeans had been
better prepared for a vigorous military self-defense. But "West-
'"One could argue that they also sought a showdown within the United States
as well by challenging the genius of the Truman Administration's program.
"Herbert Hoover to Homer Ferguson, July 20, 1950; Hoover Papers, Public
Statements, Tab 3242.
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ern Europe outside of Britain has no will to fight a general war
with Russia," even though their own preparedness would prob-
ably preclude such a war. "Nor do they have the will to ade-
quately prepare."'^
Truman administration officials had elaborated a rationale
for the United Nations that was based on arrangements between
the Soviet Union and the United States made toward the end of
World War II. Truman and his advisers, Clark Clifford, and
George Elsey, had not viewed the United Nations as an organiza-
tion capable of creating peace when the great powers differed.
Rather it was intended to serve as a vehicle through which the
great powers, having already privately resolved their disagree-
ments, could coerce the smaller states to police themselves within
the guidelines supplied by the great powers. The failure of this
system stemmed from the inability of the Soviet Union and the
United States to compose their differences in private.'^ Hoover
emphasized this failure, and his associates saw contradictions be-
tween the "great power" politics of World War II and bi-polar
confrontation in the "Cold War."
The Korean War created a climate for a showdown among
Americans on Asian as well as European policies. On June 27,
1950, Arthur Kemp gave Hoover an extensive digest of reports
published by the State Department implying that the United
States' interest in the Far East remained strong. "Action [in
Korea]," Kemp emphasized, "has put Truman and Acheson on
the spot."''' Here was an opportunity to break the control of
foreign and military policy by a liberal elite. '^  As the administra-
tion's response to the war developed, pro-Hoover elements grew
angry at what they considered excessive reliance on U.S. forces
and resented their failure to make an effective political dent on
the Truman-Acheson policies. On September 14, 1950, Kemp re-
ported to Hoover: "As of July 27, 1950, the only fighting forces of
'^Off-the-record speech at the Bohemian Club, July 30, 1950; Hoover Papers,
Public Statements, Tab 3242.
'For the attitudes of Truman and his advisers on the role of the United Na-
see Mrozek, "Peace Through Strength . . .," pp. 167-172.
'Arthur Kemp to Herbert Hoover, June 27, 1950; Hoover Papers. Post-Pres-
idential Subject File. Foregin Policy-General folder.
"See foreign policy memorandum from Arthur Kemp to Herbert Hoover,
(undated); Hoover Papers, Post-Presidential Subject File, Foreign Policy-General
folder.
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any consequences [sic] engaged in the Korean War were Ameri-
can."" The danger was now serious enough that United States
commitments in Asia prefigured what might happen in Europe.
It was certainly not true that the Hooverites wanted to desert
Asia. They wanted Asians to stabilize the conditions in which
American interests could easily be protected; much of their
support for Chiang Kai-shek stemmed from his evident willing-
ness to be an active ally—a willingness that contrasted sharply
with the mood of the Europeans.
The pattern of military problems around the world cast doubt
on the value of sending American troops to fill out the prospective
divisions of NATO. Hoover's own opposition to "troops for
Europe" was simply a manifestation of his unchanging Wilsonian
liberalism, which has more commonly been called "conserva-
tism." Doubting the sincerity of the Europeans, the former presi-
dent questioned their ability to use properly any short-term
American troop commitment. On May 6, 1950, he sent a memo-
randum to Senator Wherry concerning the "Military situation in
America and other countries relative to impending war." Hoover
expressed irritation that "at least one of the major European alli-
ance powers is decreasing its debt while ours increases in order
to subsidize them." This had to stop. With its nuclear monopoly
gone, the United States could not hope to arm "any effective part
of these 160,000,000 people in Western Europe—to say nothing
of the 500,000,000 in South Asia." The conclusion was simple:
each country must contribute to its own defense. "The time has
come," Hoover summarized, "when we should find out beyond
any question of a doubt whether the Nations of Western Europe
and Southern Asia are willing to do far more themselves for their
own defense."" He and his sympathizers wanted Germany and
Japan rearmed and Franco's Spain allowed to join NATO.
But these opportunistic shifts in American policy would not
suffice to ensure peace under the status quo. "The real question,"
Kemp summarized in a draft for Hoover, "is the extent and na-
ture of the 'self-help' which the nations of Western Europe agreed
"Arthur Kemp to Herbert Hoover, August 14, 1950; Hoover Papers, Post-
Presidential Subject File, Foreign Policy-General folder.
""Confidential Memorandum to Senator Wherry Concerning the Military
Situation in America and Other Countries Relative to Impeding War," from Her-
bert Hoover, May 6, 1950; Hoover Papers, Public Statements, Tab 3224.
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to provide" in their commitment to NATO. Kemp denied John
Foster Dulles' assertion that the United States was bound under
the North Atlantic Treaty to rescue the western European states
under any circumstances. This denial was more than an attempt
to limit American responsibilities in NATO. It was also an effort
to wrest control of policy from the executive branch, particularly
the president and secretary of state, and to restore it to Congress
as the body most representative of public sentiment. Kemp sug-
gested to Hoover that the American people disagreed with Ache-
son's assertion that the United States, and its allies in the United
Nations, had met the challenge in Korea. "Nor are they willing to
accept the meager forces as a definition of the 'fair' contribution
of nations other than the United States."" Why should the
United States yield to French sensitivity concerning the Franco
regime when the French themselves were trying to minimize their
contribution to western defense? Even more important, why
should the United States persist in spending its resources to de-
fend countries unwilling to help themselves. As prosperity had
been "just around the corner" in the early 1930s, provided the in-
dividual American followed the urgings of Hoover, so would
security be just around the corner of the perceived Soviet threat if
western Europe and southeast Asia set to work immediately. This
was the irreducible objection of the Hooverites to Truman's mili-
tary program overseas. They denied that terms such as "isola-
tionist, retreatist, and defeatist" described them accurately.
Rather the problem was "Europe's ability to help themselves to-
day—not at some indefinite future time.""
Hoover wanted to retain interests in Europe but believed that
they depended largely on a favorable response by the Europeans
to American initiatives. Once again, it was the confiict in Korea
that occasioned doubts about the value of alliance with Europe.
The American commitment in Korea had not sparked a great
rallying of forces in western Europe, and the failure of the Euro-
peans to unite swiftly behind the United States struck their
"Draft memorandum from Arthur Kemp to Herbert Hoover, (undated; by
context, first half 1951); Hoover Papers, Post-Presidential Subject File, Foreign
Policy-General folder.
"Draft Memorandum, "Possibilities in Reply Speech," from Arthur Kemp
to Herbert Hoover, (undated; by context, first half 1951); Hoover Papers, Post-
Presidential Subject File, Foreign Policy-Opposition Speeches folder.
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critics as low and opportunistic. The ambiguity in the policies of
the western European states convinced Hoover to urge public
limits to the American commitment overseas.
On November 1, 1950, Hoover delivered a speech before the
Military Order of Foreign Wars of the United States in New York
City. From General Dwight Eisenhower he received the Award for
Outstanding Citizenship. He then proceeded to attack the Euro-
pean defense policies that Eisenhower had helped create. Point-
ing out that "disarmament flows only from peace, not peace from
disarmament," Hoover called for increased defense contributions
from the North Atlantic Pact nations. Since "our present pro-
jected program will overstrain our economy if continued more
than temporarily," the European nations must "call upon their
own manpower, their own factories, their own productive re-
sources in far greater dimensions than is at all evident today."
Hoover ended by warning that "otherwise the American people
must re-form their lines to cover an area restricted to that which
we can defend within our own resources.^" The nation was not
omnipotent and must avoid any effort at manning Europe's de-
fenses unaided.
In reality, offers to cooperate with Europe were disingenuous.
Hoover's supporters did not actually believe that the Europeans
would arm adequately against a Soviet threat. Arthur Kemp told
Hoover that they were in despair after two world wars and that
they believed an unopposed Soviet occupation would be signifi-
cantly less damaging than an active war. In addition, the French
feared the Germans, and Communists and Socialists in western
European parliaments objected to military alliance with the
United States.^' In a speech on January 31, 1951, former Kansas
governor and once presidential candidate Alf Landon stated: "It
seems to me the crucial thing we are up against is the lack of a will
to fight for their own freedom in the western democracies.""
"Speech by Herbert Hoover to the Military Order of Foreign Wars of the
United States, New York City, November 1, 1950; Hoover Papers, Public State-
ment 3259.
"Memorandum, "The Reasons Europe Will Not Adequately Arm Against
Russia," from Arthur Kemp to Herbert Hoover, (undated; by context, December,
1950); Hoover Papers, Public Statements, Tab 3262.
"Speech by Alf M. Landon to High Twelve Club, January 31, 1951; Hoover
papers Post-Presidential File, Landon folder.
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Similarly, Senator Knowland told Hoover that Europe was un-
likely to meet its requirements and recalled the example of Korea.
Knowland asserted that the United States "has put up 90% of the
forces and suffered 90% of the casualties of the forces furnished
by United Nations members."" Hoover concluded that there was
"little public belief [in Europe] that there was risk of Russian in-
vasion in the near future." He also believed that the Europeans
thought "the opportunities for the Kremlin [were] in Asia and
that its face [was] turned East."^" Ironically, the same Korean ex-
perience that had made "troops for Europe" seem so much more
necessary to many Americans made arming against the Soviet
Union seem superfluous to many Europeans." As far as Hoover
was concerned, they would simply have to accept the conse-
quences of their own choices. Europe's failure to respond, which
Dwight Eisenhower admitted, made its nations seem defeatist
and parasitical. Hoover was not about to support an "interna-
tional dole" that would bankrupt the country and threaten its
security without even assuring loyalty among its allies in a pro-
spective crisis.
Hoover's particular objections to the way the Korean War was
being managed provided him with a chance to aftack the general
framework of policy in which it rested. Just as he questioned the
efficacy of NATO and the UN, so did he criticize Truman's use of
conventional ground forces. Hoover considered ground warfare
especially conducive to stalemate. The conduct of the Korean
War thus violated his convictions about the predominant impor-
tance of air power. Hoover asked Senator Wherry whether Gen-
eral MacArthur had advised Truman on Korean policy, as much
to keep watch over MacArthur as to gain ammunition against
Truman." Later he complained to General Bonner Fellers, head
"William F. Knowland to Herbert Hoover, February 2, 1951; Hoover
Papers, Post-Presidential Individual File. Knowland folder. Knowland excluded
South Korean troops from his calculations.
"Statement, "The Year Since the Great Debate," by Herbert Hoover, (un-
dated; early 1951); Hoover Papers, Public Statements.
"On European defense, see Eisenhower to Robert A. Lovett, December 13,
1951; Eisenhower Papers, Personal Files—Pre-Presidential, Lovett folder. For a
general survey of this effort, see David W. White, "The Effect of the Attitudes
and Actions of Dwight D. Eisenhower on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
1950-1956: (M.A. thesis, Kansas State University, 1973).
"Kenneth S. Wherry to Herbert Hoover, September 28, 1950; Hoover Pa-
pers, Post-Presidential Individual File, Wherry folder.
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of the Veterans Division of the Republican National Committee,
that MacArthur should have followed his advice: "stop and dig in
on the short line across Korea—and then use his air force on any
armies north of that area."^' In this way, air power could also ef-
fect a disengagement on the ground that would permit thoughtful
diplomatic action, including possible withdrawal from the United
Nations operation altogether.
Reviewing the year since he inaugurated the "Great Debate,"
Hoover set out in detail the defects of ground forces. "If our econ-
omy should collapse," Hoover warned, "Stalin's victory would be
complete." Therefore "to maintain the economic strength of the
United States and to prevent its socialization does not permit our
building up great ground armies in addition to overwhelming air
and sea forces and supply of munitions to other nations."^' The
United States might continue to serve as "arsenal of democracy."
It could continue to provide "artillery support" through the Air
Force and Navy. But other nations would have to supply the in-
fantry. The domestic needs of the United States required it.
Hoover refused to let international concerns dictate the char-
acter of American society. Taft's votes on the United Nations and
NATO already constituted some compromise with foreign de-
mands. As Hoover saw it, however, to allow the international
military situation to dictate the internal structure of the United
States and to force the redefinition of its national objectives would
be to surrender all that would have been worth fighting for in the
first place. For this reason. Hoover aftached greater importance
to the preservation of the national economy than to the forced
construction of international military alliances. Reviewing the
events of 1951, when the extraordinary expenses of the Korean
War pushed the national military budget to more than $60 bil-
lion. Hoover asserted that "the outstanding phenomenon is the
dangerous overstraining of our economy by gigantic expendi-
tures."" In itself, this view was neither new nor unique to Hoover
and his associates. Dwight Eisenhower, himself an object of deep
suspicion to the Hooverites, had already warned the Truman Ad-
ministration to seek "the highest level to which you think these [de-
"Herbert Hoover to Bonner Fellers, December 3, 1950; Hoover Papers, Post-
Presidential Individual File, Fellers folder.
"Hoover, "The Year Since the Great Debate."
'-Ibid.
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fense] expenditures can go without breaking us internally. . . .""'
Similarly, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall had told the
president's Air Policy Commission in 1947 that they must find a
criterion by which to limit military spending. The difference be-
tween what Eisenhower, and Royall, and the Hooverites proposed
lay less in dollar-volume than in the duration of the program.
Royall had continued his remarks in 1947 to suggest: "I do not
think we have approached the absolute limit of what we could
spend." After observing the escalation of American involvement
in Greece, Turkey, Korea, and the projected military alliances.
Hoover was less sanguine and emphasized that infiationary
spending would produce disaster in the long run: "A man may
carry a load of 300 pounds across the room, but he will break his
back if he carries it around the block."" Both Royall and Hoover
saw difficulties in long-run over-spending, but Hoover's
"long-run" was shorter than Royall's.
The susceptibility of Americans to faulty economic policies
was, by extension of its consequences, a military reality. It had re-
sulted, according to Hoover, from decades of conditioning by slo-
gans extolling novelty:
We have had the "New Order," the New Freedom, the New Day, the
New Era, and New Outlook, the New Epoch, the New Economy, the New
Dawn, the New Deal, the New Religion, the New Liberalism, the New
War and several New Foreign Policies.
And the New Testament is too often omitted. After each "New" we have
a relapse and take another pill, also labelled "New.""
All of these programs, he suggested, deviated from conventional
American ideals, guidelines, and wisdom. Most of them, "like
the Apples of Sodom, have turned to bitter ashes in our national
mouth." He concluded that "our greatest danger is not from in-
vasion by foreign armies. Our dangers are that we may commit
'"Testimony of Dwight Eisenhower, November 11, 1947 (revised version); Re-
cords of the President's Air Policy Commission, Harry S. Truman Library, Royall
folder.
"Hoover, "The Year Since the Great Debate."
"Speech at the Bohemian Grove Encampment, by Herbert Hoover, July 18,
1951; Hoover Papers, Public Statements. Among those sharing Hoover's resent-
ment of politico-social novelties were Admiral Richard E. Byrd (Byrd to Hoover,
October 29, 1950; Hoover Papers, Public Statement 3262), and K. T. Keller,
chairman of the board of the Chrysler Corporation (Keller to Hoover, January 8,
1951; Hoover Papers, Public Statement 3262).
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suicide from within by complaisance with evil.""
Because of his complex view on the relationship of domestic
and international policy. Hoover found no pleasure in the
prospect of an Eisenhower presidential candidacy. Perhaps Taft
had been too slow, too cautious, and too qualified in his
commitments. But Eisenhower was a part of Truman's
international team. He was the commander and one of the
architects of its key alliance with western Europe. On August 2,
1950, Arthur Bliss Lane criticized the general for assisting
Truman in lulling "the people of this country into a state of
complacency" by "persuading [them] that we are not in a world
war today."" As criticism of Truman's handling of the Korean
engagement intensified, Eisenhower's political supporters urged
that he avoid comment on Asian affairs. Yet Eisenhower formally
expressed confidence in the president, much to Truman's
pleasure.^* During the subsequent weeks of debate over the
removal of General MacArthur from command in Korea,
Eisenhower remained closely allied with Truman.
To opponents of America's international policies, Eisenhower
was the embodiment of Truman's brand of bipartisanship. To
them he seemed weak, opportunistic, and unprincipled. Hoover's
staff compiled a folder of Eisenhower's statements on major
national and international problems designed to expose these
flaws. He was styled a friend of the Soviet Union in 1945, saying
that "nothing guides Russian policy so much as the desire for
friendship with the United States." He was quoted as "urging
mobilization at wartime speed after telling Congress the U.S.
should more than double its European forces this year by basing
six divisions there and boost the total to 12 by the end of 1952. " "
[emphasis by staff] In a pre-Convention draft statement. Hoover
"Speech at the Bohemian Grove Encampment, by Herbert Hoover, July 28,
1951; Hoover Papers, Public Statements.
"Arthur Bliss Lane to Herbert Hoover, August 2, 1950; Hoover Papers, Post-
Presidential Individual File, Lane folder.
"See Harry S. Truman to Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 12, 1951; Eisen-
hower Papers, Personal Files—Pre-Presidential, Truman folder; Memorandum
from Harry S. Truman to W. Averell Harriman, April 24, 1951; Eisenhower
Papers, Personal Files—Pre-Presidential, Truman folder.
"Staff compilation, "Eisenhower Versus Eisenhower," (undated; by context.
Summer 1952); Hoover Papers, Post-Presidential Individual File, Eisenhower
folder.
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summarized: "General Eisenhower has at all times, so far as any
record shows, been a part of the Truman Foreign Policies."" The
evils developing within American society were thus Eisenhower's,
as well as Truman's, responsibility. "He cannot criticize
inflation, taxes and degeneration of the American economy which
are the necessary outcome of the policies he developed and
fostered."'' Eisenhower had supposedly allowed his estimate of
the European situation to take precedence over his understanding
of the socio-economic structure of the United States.
A memorandum circulated by Senator Homer Ferguson
asserted that the Eisenhower movement "seriously threatens the
two-party system." The author compared Eisenhower to Wendell
Willkie, stating that both had Democratic backgrounds and that
neither represented Republican party principles. As the "price
people will have to pay for an Eisenhower victory," the
memorandum enumerated "permanent conscription and military
service for all young men and women, permanent stationing of
American troops in foreign countries, permanent economic
and military support of Europe," and "American substitution for
the role played by the British Empire in world politics (not-
withstanding the fate which that role has visited upon Great
Britain)!'" The danger was the capture of the Republican Party by
the "Military-Internationalist-New Deal group" who could finally
transform themselves into "something of a National Liberal
Party.""" Thus Eisenhower himself was unacceptable because his
movement was seen as a constitutional threat and a challenge to
the American way of life. It was his particular form of
internationalism, and his alleged yielding to foreign over
American interests, that Hoover opposed.
In the final analysis, it was Hoover's special definition of
American individualism that forced him to oppose Truman's
"Draft statement. "The Truman-Eisenhower Foreign Policies," by Herbert
Hoover, (undated; by context, pre-Convention 1952); Hoover Papers, Post-Presi-
dential Subject File, Foreign Policy, Truman-Eisenhower folder. The Legal Ad-
viser of the Department of State, Robert A. Low, agreed. See Low to Elsey, Sep-
tember 22, 1952; Papers of George Elsey, Harry S. Truman Library, Dulles
folder.
"Draft statement, "The Truman-Eisenhower Foreign Policies."
"Staff memorandum, "Validity of the Eisenhower Movement Within the
Republican Party," transmitted by Homer Ferguson to Herbert Hoover, May 8,
1952; Hoover Papers, Post-Presidential Individual File, Eisenhower folder.
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policies and to resist Eisenhower's presidential candidacy. The
creation of a large, permanent military force overseas
represented, for the former president, an internationalization of
the dole that he had criticized during the tenure of Franklin
Roosevelt. The pursuit of the values of American individualism
forced him to oppose sending troops to Europe, demanded that
he seek the expulsion of communists from the United Nations,
and called his attention to political and consititutional questions
in the United States. Because Hoover's protest failed, there was
no workable alternative to the administration's policy, which left
the door open for increasingly elaborate military involvement
around the world.
In labeling Hoover an isolationist, Truman's supporters were
wrong. To advocate an actively interventionist policy in Japan and
Formosa, to support anti-communist activity in Southeast Asia,
to encourage the continuation of United States dominance in the
Western Hemisphere, and to call for close ties with Britain and
coastal Europe hardly constitutes isolation and the adoption of a
mere "fortress" posture before the rest of the world. The fact that
he could be so characterized merely underscored how far beyond
isolationism the entire country had moved. For Hoover, a sensible
military program could be defined only in terms of real or clearly
anticipated threats. While Hoover's military would thus be
basically defensive in concept and function, Truman's military
was not only to protect what existed in the world but to achieve
what existed only in the imaginations of expansionist planners.
The revolution in methods for expanding American influence
that Truman had authorized compelled Hoover to fight the
administration's military policy. He did not object to economic
and diplomatic penetration of foreign states. As president, he had
encouraged it himself. But he rejected the means that Truman
had chosen to achieve it, involving the expansion of the nation's
armed forces overseas and the ratification of the "Roosevelt
revolution" at home. Ultimately, Hoover wished to overturn not
merely Henry Wallace's "century of the common man" but also
the fatuous global expansionism of Henry Luce's "American
century." Hoover was content with an American hemisphere
whose lines of communication and trade with other parts of the
world remained free and open. For, as he saw it, it was the
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unrestrained generation of new American interests around the
world, under the presidency of Truman and the inspiration of his
advisers, that endangered the possibilities for imperial growth
within the domestic limits of Constitution and tradition.
Heritage ofDubuque—An Architectural View, text by
Lawrence J. Sommer, and illustrations by Carl Johnson, is
an impressive cataloguing of the buildings of Iowa's oldest
city. Johnson's drawings and watercolors of historic edifices
and homes, accompanied by numerous photographs, map
Dubuque's heritage from the early years, 1830-1860, up
through what is termed "a period of transition," 1890-1930.
Early crude log structures gave way to more sophisticated
buildings made of materials native to the area: wood, stone,
sandstone, and brick. The final chapter in the book dis-
cusses progress and plans toward restoring certain land-
marks in the city. Sommer feels that "perhaps the most
striking achievement has been the restoration of the
Orpheum Theater. It is once again one of the most hand-
some buildings on Main Street."
As in almost all older American cities, Dubuque can
count many old homes, churches, schools, etc. lost to park-
ing lots, new office buildings and remodeling projects.
Some of the losses were due to "natural disasters," however,
like the old town clock building which collapsed on May 25,
1872. A new one was quickly erected the following year.
"Today, over a hundred years later, local residents still set
their watches by this town clock." It is a sad revelation to
see that the once beautiful and spired Illinois Central rail-
road passenger depot has been reduced over the years to a
squat, flat-looking freight terminal.
The Heritage ofDubuque is the Bicentennial project of
the First National Bank ofDubuque—with the proceeds go-
mg to the restoration of the Orpheum Theater, which will
become the Five Flags Civic Center. The book can be
secured from the Five Flags Office, Room 622, Dubuque
Building, Dubuque, Iowa 52001 for $12.50.—Ed.

